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VIRGINIA BELIJ TAYLOR, Appellant, v. A. J. HA WKIN-
SON, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-A and an order 
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are 
appealable, but not the jury verdict or an order denying a 
new trial. 
[2] Judgments-Res Judicata-Identities Demanded: Estoppel in 
Action on Different Cause.-vvhere the causes of action and 
the parties are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar 
to a second action; and where the causes of action are different 
but the parties are the same, the doctrine of res judicata ap-
plies so as to render conclusive matters which were decided 
in the first judgment. 
(3] Id.-Res Judicata-Identity of Causes of Action: Matters Con-
cluded.-A prior judgment operates as a bar against a second 
action on the same cause, but in a later action on a different 
claim or cause it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudi-
cation as to such issues in the second action as were actually 
litigated and determined in the first. 
[4] Appeal-Objections-New Trial-Verdict.--In an action by 
husband and wife and the driver of an automobile in which 
the wife was riding for arising out of a collision, 
where the evidence supported the trial court's implied finding 
that the verdicts for plaintiffs following the first trial were 
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine the 
issue of liability, and where the wife's motion for new trial 
was granted on the ground that the damages were insufficient, 
failure of defendant or plaintiff's husband and the driver to 
move for a new trial was tantamount to accepting the jury's 
compromise as their own. 
[5] Judgments-Res Judicata-Matters Not Adjudicated.-In an 
action by husband and wife and the driver of an automobile 
in which the wife was riding for damages arising out of a 
collision, compromise verdicts for plaintiffs did not constitute 
such a determination of the issues of liability as to render 
them res judicata on subsequent retrial of the action where 
the wife, who alone was granted a motion for new trial on the 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, .Tudgm<•nts, ~ 314 <'t sPq.; Am.Jur., .Tuilgmrnts, 
§ 161 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal aml §~ 2fi, 48.1, 74; [2] 
Judgments, §§ 355, 367; [3] Judgments, ~§ 357, 3!!5(1); [4] Ap~ 
peal and Error, § 235; [5] Judgments, § 339. 
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ground that the damages were insufficient, sought to limit the 
trial to the issue of damages on the ground that the judgment 
in favor of her husband and the driver was conclusive against 
defendant on the issue of liability, since defendant did not 
have his day in court during the first trial on the issue of 
liability. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, from a jury verdict, and from orders deny-
ing motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for 
new triaL Walter R. Evans, Judge.* Judgment and order 
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
affirmed; appeal from jury verdict and order denying a new 
trial, dismissed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
collision of vehicles. ,Judgment for defendant affirmed. 
N. E. Youngblood and William R. Grant for Appellant. 
Wyman & Finell and Saul Grayson for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Virginia 'l'aylor, hereinafter referred to 
as plaintiff, was injured when the car in which she was riding 
was struck from the rear by a car driven by defendant. The 
car was registered in the name of her husband and was being 
driven by a friend, Laurine Holibaugh. Plaintiff, her hus-
band, and the driver brought an action for damages against 
defendant, and the jury returned verdicts of $65 for personal 
injuries suffered by the driver, $63.06 in favor of plaintiff's 
husband for damages to the car, and $371.94 for personal 
injuries suffered by plaintiff. Judgment was entered on the 
verdicts, and plaintiff alone moved for a new trial on the 
ground that the damages were insufficient. Her motion was 
granted and thereafter the judgment in favor of her husband 
and the driver became finaL On retrial plaintiff sought to 
limit the trial to the issue of damages on the ground that 
the judgment in favor of her husband and the driver was 
conclusive against defendant on the issue of liability. Over 
her objection the trial court submitted the issue of liability 
to the jury, which returned a verdict for defendant. Judg-
ment was entered on the and plaintiff's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, 
*Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council. 
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for a new trial \vas denied. [1] Plaintiff appeals from the 
judgment, and the order denying her motion 
for judgment the verdiet or for a new trial. 
Since only the and the order denying the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are appealable 
(Code Civ. § 963), the other appeals are dismissed. 
Plaintiff contends that this ease is governed by the rule 
stated in Ber·nharcl v. B(];nk of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 813 
l122 P.2d 892], that "In determining the validity of a plea 
of res judicata three questions are pertinent: \Vas the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question 1 \Vas there a final judg-
ment on the merits? \Vas the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication?" lVIoreover, she asserts that even if a require-
ment of mutuality of estoppel should be deemed essential in 
this case, it is met by the fact that she was in privity with 
her husband in his cause of action for damages to the car. 
(Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 321 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A..L.R. 
2d 461] .) Defendant contends, on the other hand, that even 
though the judgment in favor of the husband and the driver 
may be final for some purposes, since it was entered in 
the same action in which plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
was granted and since the issue of defendant's negligence was 
common to all parts of the first judgment, the part as to which 
a new trial was neither sought nor granted cannot be res 
judicata as to the issues set at large by the granting of 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (See American Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210, 218 [246 P.2d 935].) 
It may be conceded that the judgment in favor of plaintiff's 
husband and the driver is now final, that their causes of action 
are merged therein, and that it constitutes a bar to any 
further prosecution of their original claims. [2] As was 
pointed out in Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [99 
P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ; the doctrine of res judicata has two 
aspects. "First, where the causes of action and the parties 
are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar in the 
second action. 'fhis is fundamental and is everywhere eon-
ceded. 
"Second, where the causes of action are different but the 
parties are the same, the doctrine applies so as to render 
conclusive matters which were decided by the first judgment. 
[3] As this court said in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 
695 [28 P.2d 916]: 'A. prior judgment operates as a bar against 
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a second action the same cause, but m a later action 
upon a different elaim or of it operates as an 
estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the 
second action as were actually litigated and determined in 
the first action.' '' In the present case, since plaintiff's cause 
of action is different from those of her husband and the 
driver, we are concerned with the second stated above, 
and the question presented is whether defendant's liability 
was a matter decided or an issue that was actually litigated 
and determined within the meaning of the foregoing rule. 
[ 4] There is ample evidence to support the trial court's 
implied finding that the verdicts following the first trial were 
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine 
the issue of liability. The damages awarded plaintiff were 
less than her special damages, and the parties concede that 
they were so inadequate that a new trial limited to the issue 
of damages would have been improper. (See Rose v. Melody 
Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 489 [247 P.2d 335] .) Moreover, it is 
obvious that if the jury failed to determine the issue of 
liability in returning the verdict for plaintiff, it also failed 
to determine that issue in returning the verdicts for her 
husband and the driver. Accordingly, had defendant or 
plaintiff's husband and the driver moved for a new trial, 
it would have been granted, and their failure to do so was 
tantamount to accepting the jury's compromise as their 
own. (See Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462, 470-471 [247 
P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185].) [5] Regardless of the effec-
tiveness of such a compromise in extinguishing the causes 
of action or in settling the rights directly involved therein 
(see Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 475 [12 P. 480] ; 
Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 389 [238 P. 81] ; FitzGerald 
v. Terminal Dev. Co., 11 Cal.App.2d 126, 135-136 [53 P.2d 
177, 55 P .2d 194] ) , it does not constitute such a determination 
of the issues involved as to render them res judicata where 
distinct rights are sought to be litigated in a separate cause 
of action. (United States v. International Bt~ilding Co., 345 
U.S. 502, 506 [73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182]; Lawler v. Na-
tional Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 324, 327 [75 S.Ct. 
865, 99 L.Ed. 1122] ; Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 
311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W.2d 315, 317] ; Reeves v. Philadelphia 
Gas Works Co., 107 Pa. Super. 422 [164 A. 132, 134] ; Frue-
hauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330; Marchant v. 
Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3 N.Y.S.2d 496, 
498] ; see Hall v. Coyle, 38 Cal.2d 543, 546 [241 P.2d 236] ; 
Feb.1957] TAYLOR V. HAWKINSON 
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Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 843 [129 P.2d 390] ; Rest., 
Judgments, § 68.) To hold otherwise would tend to defeat 
rather than to promote the objective of preventing vexatious 
litigation with its attendant expense both to the parties and 
the public. Defendant did not have his day in court dur-
ing the first trial on the issue of liability, and plaintiff 
can now justify making that judgment binding upon him 
in her action only on the ground that he had an opportunity 
to attack it. Had he done so, more rather than less litigation 
would have ensued, and plaintiff would have gained nothing. 
Defendant did not vex her by seeking a redetermination of 
an issue once decided, but sought and secured only the right 
to have the issue of liability determined once after plaintiff 
by securing a new trial on all issues had established the 
propriety thereof. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that a judgment, which on its face determines 
the question of liability in a negligence action, is not res 
judicata on that issue by way of collateral estoppel in another 
action on the theory that the question of liability was not 
decided because the jury in the first action assertedly com-
promised on the issue of liability. Whatever way you cut it, 
the result reached by the majority is that an alleged compro-
mise verdict (balancing liability against the amount of dam-
ages) is subject to collateral attack on that ground. 
The facts are not involved and some legal points are clear 
and these are conceded by the majority. Three plaintiffs 
obtained judgments against defendant in an action in which 
his liability is based, by virtue of the pleadings, the instruc-
tions to the jury, the jury's verdict and the judgment itself, 
on the negligence of the defendant; that issue was necessarily 
involved, indeed, it was the only issue except the fact and 
amount of damages. One of the plaintiffs was granted a new 
trial, but as to the others, the judgment became final, and 
the trial court denied the plea of res judicata on the retrial 
as to the one plaintiff. There was a privity between the 
plaintiff obtaining the new trial and one of the other plaintiffs, 
her husband (see Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315 [202 P.2d 
47 C.2d-29 
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73, 6 A.L.It.2d 461] ) , hence there can be no 
judgment for the 
point is made that these 
[47 C.2d 
given in the same action, and I it the situation would be 
no different if they had been obtained in 
actions. The judgment for the was res 
judicata as it was based upon which pre-
sented the issue of defendant's ; the 
jury was instructed on that issue; its verdict was general, 
thus deciding that issue; and the was on the verdict 
and therefore decided that issue. vV e have, therefore, a clear 
case of the judgment being res on the question of 
defendant's liability as to one-plaintiff-wife-who was in 
privity to the plaintiff-husband (Zaragosa v. Craven, supra). 
In such a case we have a situation where under the doctrine 
of res judicata, the defendant is collaterally estopped to ques-
tion the final determination that he was negligent. Yet the 
majority arrives at a different conclusion by reasoning that 
the verdict on which the judgment was based was a compro-
mise (supposedly low damages because some jurors thought 
there should be no liability) which is true because the judg-
ment as to plaintiff-wife, as to which a new trial was granted, 
was a compromise because the damages were lower than the 
amount of the special damages suffered and proved. It is 
then concluded that defendant and plaintiff-husband "ac-
cepted'' the compromise verdict and thus, in effect, com-
promised the res judicata judgment; hence there is no col-
lateral estoppel because a judgment based on a compromise 
does not give rise to such estoppel. 
Accepting for the moment that reasoning and speaking to 
the legal proposition that a judgment based on a compromise 
settlement cannot give rise to a collateral estoppel, I find 
the law to be otherwise. It is the general rule that a judg-
ment entered by consent or agreement is res judicata in the 
sense that it is a bar to another action on the same cause of 
action as distinguished from collateral estoppel. (Partridge v. 
Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 475 [12 P. 480] ; City of Oakland v. 
Oakland Water Front Co., 162 Cal. 675, 686 [124 P. 251]; 
Semple v. Wright, 32 Cal. 659; C1·ossman v. Davis, 79 Cal. 
603 [21 P. 963] ; Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 P. 
81]; Nielsen v. Eme1·son, 119 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281]; 
Guaranty L. Corp. v. Boanl of Supervisors, 22 Cal.App.2d 
684 [71 P.2d 931]; Patterson v. Spring Valley Water Co., 207 
Cal. 739 [279 P. 1001] ; Goddard v. Secttrity Title Ins. & Guar. 
f'eb. 1957] 
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; Lamb v. II en1don, 97 CaL 
also many cases eited 2 A.L.R.2d 
v. Bhepa.rd, supra, 71 Cal. 




any otl1er judicial record, by 
in the court rendering it, 
the parties, or by proof of 
fraud on the the reeord. '' And the 
as collateral estoppel is in-
S1tpm, 71 Cal. 470; 
Semple v. t, supra. Cal. 659; llfcC1·eery v. Fuller, 
63 Cal. 30: Cros~mon ,-. supra, 79 Cal. 603; H elpling v. 
Ilelpling, 50 676 95 P. 715]; FitzGerald v. Termi-
nal Dev. Co., H Cal.App.2d J26 [5:1 P.2d 177, 55 P.2d 194].) 
It is said in 2 A.TJ.R.2d 543: "As a general proposition, 
where a question of fact 0ssential to a judgment is actually 
litigatecl and determinc•fl thereby, the determination is eon-
elusive between the partirs and their privies in a subsequent 
action, even though sneh action involves a different cause of 
action .... 
"Except in ea:ses tax liability for succe;;;sive tax 
periods, it is well settlrcl that a by consent raises 
an estoppel in the same way as a Jttdgment entered after 
contest, and this has be0n reeognized even by those courts 
wl1ich profess to adhere to the theory that a consent judgment 
or decree is, strictly not res jmlicata." (Emphasis 
added.) The ease;;; cited in the majority opinion are not 
to the contrary. Holl v. 38 Cal.2d 543 [241 P.2d 236], 
and Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839 [129 P.2d 390], the Cali-
fornia cases, hold that an issue withheld from decision 
by the court is llot res j nil ieata or that an action on a com-
promise of a claim is 11ot the same as an action on the 
claim. It is sairl in Unit('rl Stales Y. International Building 
Co., :143 U.S. ~05 S.Ct. 807. 97 hErl. 1182]: "A 
judgment enici'(·d ·wiill Jllf• conse11t nf the may involve 
a detennilllliinll of fad an(l law by the court. 
But unless a ihat illat wa;;; the case, the 
, flO far as collateral estoppel 
entered only as a compro-
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mise of the parties." Lawlor v. National Screen Service 
Corp., 349 U.S. 322 [75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122], refused 
to apply res judicata because to do so would violate an im-
portant public policy, the United States anti-trust laws. 
Bttrgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W. 
2d 315], rejected the proposition that a consent judgment is 
res judicata, which as seen is squarely contrary to the law 
of this state and nearly all jurisdictions elsewhere. The same 
is true of Reeves v. Philadelphia Gas Works Co., 107 Pa. 
Super. 422 [164 A. 132], and Fruehanf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 
167 F.2d 324, and the International Building Company case. 
In Marchant v. Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3 
N.Y.S.2d 496], the issue as to which estoppel by former judg-
ment was sought was not decided by the former judgment. 
The decision of the majority is, therefore, contrary to the 
established law of this state. 
In the foregoing discussion I have accepted the proposition 
that this was a consent judgment and pointed out that even 
as such it was res judicata, but it was not a consent judgment. 
There was no agreement, settlement or compromise except 
that which the majority imposes as a matter of law as dis-
tinguished from the voluntary understanding of the parties. 
The judgment urged as estoppel had been entered. It un-
questionably decided the issue of the defendant's liability. 
It was rendered after a contest in a trial and on the jury's 
verdict. The only consent feature that might arise is because 
defendant did not attack the judgment by appeal or other-
wise. He permitted it to become final. Nothing occurred in 
the conduct of the parties nor in any communication between 
them that indicated an actual compromise or agreement to 
accept the jury's so-called compromise. The failure to appeal 
was nothing more than permitting the judgment to stand by 
default, the same as if no answer or contest had been made 
to the complaint and a default judgment was entered. As is 
said in Helpling v. Helpling, 50 Cal.App. 676, 682 [195 P. 
715] : "The appellant's contention that the former judgment 
between the parties hereto did not render matters involved 
therein res adjudicata for the reason that it was a consent 
judgment is not borne out to the extent claimed by the 
appellant; for while it appears that the trial judge in an 
informal interview with the parties gave expression to some 
doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the case, these 
doubts were not carried into the formal judgment; and it 
has been repeatedly held that the remarks of a trial judge 
Feb.1957] TAYLOR V. HAWKINSON 
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made during the progress of the case, even though they amount 
to the giving of his reasons for his decision, become no part 
of the judgment, and cannot be held to control or alter its 
substance and effect. So far as the record herein discloses, 
the only matter embraced in said judgment to which it was 
suggested that the parties give their consent was that of the 
amount and duration of the separate maintenance to be al-
lowed the plaintiff therein. As to all other matters involved 
in the case the judgment became res adjttdicata, and hence 
properly relied upon by the respondent herein to defeat the 
present action." And in Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d 
583 [119 P.2d 919, 923]: "vVe think the very essence of a 
consent decree is that the parties thereto have entered vol-
untarily into a contract setting the dispute at rest, upon which 
contract the court has entered judgment conforming to the 
terms of the agreement, without putting the parties to the 
necessity of proof." There is here, therefore, no compromise, 
consent or settlement judgment. If it is a default judgment 
(it became final by default) then we apply the rule that a 
judgment by default is the basis of a plea of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent action involving the same 
matter, and such judgment is just as conclusive upon what-
ever is essential to support it as is a judgment after contest. 
(Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal.2d 805, 810 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R. 
2d 333]; Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal.App.2d 24 [278 P.2d 454]; 
O'Brien v. Appling, 133 Cal.App.2d 40 [283 P.2d 289]; Estate 
of Williams, 36 Cal.2d 289, 292-293 [223 P.2d 248, 22 A.lJ.R. 
2d 716]; Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605]; 
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal.App.2d 127 [177 P.2d 364] ; 
Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289; Hartson v. Shanklin, 57 
Cal. 558; Hartson v. Shanklin, 58 Cal. 248; Maddnx v. Connty 
Bank, 129 Cal. 665 [62 P. 264, 79 Am.St.Rep. 143] ; Harvey v. 
Griffiths, 133 Cal.App. 17, 23 [23 P.2d 532]; Kittridge v. 
Stevens, 16 Cal. 381; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P. 
1168]; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 8 [147 P. 1171]; Wattson v. 
Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220]; San Gabriel Valley Bank v. 
Lake View Town Co., 7 Cal. Unrep. 266 [86 P. 727]; Fry v. 
Baltimore Hotel Co., 80 Cal.App. 415 [252 P. 752]; 128 
A.L.R. 472; 29 Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments,§ 235.) 
We are left, then, with no agreement, compromise or settle-
ment, with nothing more than a judgment whose roll on its 
face unquestionably decides the question of defendant's lia-
bility. Even assuming that that judgment was the result of a 
compromise by the jurors, it must create an estoppel-be res 
902 C.2d 
judicata-unless it may of some 
ground on which it may be attacked. 
is made in response to a of 
judgment, it is collateral ( 
Inn, 45 Cal.2d 448 P.2d opinion 
cites no authority for on the 
ground that the underlying the 
judgment by opinion ad-
mits a collateral attack is not available because it says a 
res judicata judgment is final and as between the 
immediate parties thereto. It is no answer to say that the 
judgment is not res judicata because being based on a com-
promise verdict the issue of was not determined. 
(See supra, quotation from Helpling v. IIelpling, 50 Cal.App. 
676, 682.) If the jury did not decide that it decided 
nothing, and the judgment entered on its verdict would not 
be binding on the parties thereto. 'l'o say it did not decide 
the issue is to ignore the pleadings, verdict and judgment, and 
to permit a collateral attack on the judgment which is not 
permitted. 
If the majority opinion is permitted to stand, every judg-
ment entered on a verdict in a personal injury action where 
the amount of the verdict is less than the special damages 
proved, will be void and subject to collateral attack even after 
it becomes final. In other words, there will be no judgment 
and the case will remain undetermined to the same extent as 
if the jury had failed to agree on either the issue of liability 
or damages. The foregoing conclusion must follow from 
the reasoning of the majority, as the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff-husband, which established defendant's liability for 
the injuries suffered by both husband and wife, became final, 
and must be res judicata unless it may be collaterally attacked. 
If it may be collaterally attacked, it is void, and the case, 
even as to plaintiff-husband, has not been determined. I am 
sure the majority would not consciously so hold. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and instruct the 
trial court to proceed to trial on the sole issue of the amount 
of damages suffered by Virginia. 
